So I found this little security clanger in the manual page for dlopen on Mac OS X, where it states:
When path does not contain a slash character (i.e. it is just a leaf name), dlopen() searches the following until it finds a compatible Mach-O file: $LD_LIBRARY_PATH, $DYLD_LIBRARY_PATH, current working directory, $DYLD_FALLBACK_LIBRARY_PATH.
Yes, current working directory, one of the classic vulnerability injection mechanisms. This is as epically bad a security clanger as Microsoft Windows’s LoadLibrary call but, apparently, nobody cares! Linux, and Solaris have a far more sensible mechanism, where it actually enumerates the places that it looks for the library, but unless you really, horrendously eff it up, it won’t look in the current working directory.
I nearly did a spit-take when I saw this explicitly called out. In this day and age, it’s an embarassment.